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Abstract 
Energy supply is one of the crucial parts of the disaster recovery operations. With enabling new technologies in power 
engineering for smart grid such as distributed generation, distributed storage, and intelligent information and management, 
each community can establish a resilience energy production, distribution, and consumption. A household in smart grid 
system behaves as a customer and producer at the same time. This condition enabled them to reduce the power shortage after 
a disaster by minimizing the electricity usage and mutually sharing their electricity. We propose two step methodologies 
using game theory to model an electricity usage behavior and mutual support interaction in smart grid system.  
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.  
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1. Introduction 
Recently, the demand of electricity increased significantly and fluctuated dynamically. This fluctuation 
decreases generation efficiency and the peak load drives minimum requirements of electricity to be generated 
and transmitted [1]. In most developing countries, where the major user of electricity is a household, the peak 
load occurs at 18 PM – 21 PM. On the other hand, in developed countries, the peak load occurs at daytime due 
to high electricity consumption of the industrial sector. In addition, the urgent need of CO2 emissions reduction 
issue has led to the development of new grid technologies.  
Originally, the grid terminology refers to an electrical system that involves activities like electricity 
generation, transmission, distribution, and control [2]. The grid carries electrical power from a large capacity 
central generator to the users. In the early of 21th century, a smarter electricity grid (commonly called smart grid) 
had been established using two-way flows of electricity and integrated information management in a distribution 
network. Smart grid technologies have a capability to generate and distribute power in an efficient way, and 
respond effectively to a wide range conditions that may occur anywhere in the grid.  
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The introduction of electric generation based on renewable resources like sun, water, and wind, is one of the 
major parts of the smart grid. However, the amount of electricity generated from renewable sources (called micro 
grid) is fluctuating and uncontrollable [1]. In this situation, additional production of electrical power is necessary 
to reduce demand fluctuation, supply uncertainty, and avoid power shortage for some users. The supply 
uncertainty becomes worse after the occurrence of natural disaster due to the damage of some energy production 
facilities and transmission line. Furthermore, the demand for electricity is also increasing during the disaster 
recovery operations.  
Each of the users in smart grid can become a producer of electricity by installing renewable electricity source. 
We can call this user as the active user. They have an ability to manage their appliance load, generate a small 
amount of electricity from renewable sources, and keep their own energy in term of electricity and heat. Active 
users in the decentralized power system have two obvious advantages over passive user in centralized ones, such 
as improve energy usage and contribute to emission reduction [3]. Active users can both buy and sell electricity 
to the other active users, or to the electric company. 
Similar with lateral transshipment of inventory system in disaster recovery [4], each active user can mutually 
help the other active users having an electric shortage. During disaster recovery, there is a possibility that some 
group of users lost their power line connection to the electric company due to infrastructure damage. With that 
condition, they can make a cluster of active users that have the ability to self fulfill their electricity demand by 
mutual support.  
We proposed a methodology to determine the effect of mutual support between the active users in reducing 
the electricity shortage. We utilize game theory to model the behavior and interaction between active users on 
their way to maximize their benefit over electricity consumption and production. The active users are players in 
a game that defined by a common goal with different constraints and conflicting objectives. We use game against 
nature to predict the behavior of electricity consumption of active users and prisoner dilemma game to model 
the mutual support activities between them.  
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows. The following section provides an overview of several 
related work on smart grid. Section three introduces a model of user interaction to support the other active users. 
Section four describes an implementation of the model trough simulation process. We conclude this paper with 
a discussion of the result. 
2. Related work 
The development of smart power grid, that augments the traditional power grid system, is one of the greatest 
inventions in the last decade. In contrast with the traditional power grid system, that carries electrical power from 
a few central generators to a large number of users, smart grid uses two-way flows of electricity and information 
to create and distribute electricity. Smart grid includes the entire spectrum of the energy system from the points 
of generation to the points of consumption. Smart grid is decentralized electricity power system that uses two 
ways information and computational intelligence in an integrated fashion toward electricity generation, 
transmission, substations, distribution, and consumption to achieve electricity system that is safe, clean, secure, 
reliable, efficient, resilient, and sustainable [5]. The International Energy Agency concludes that, although the 
decentralized electricity system has a higher cost than centralized ones, it has potential to supply all demand with 
the same reliability but with a lower capacity margin [6]. 
We can simply define smart grid as a decentralized power grid that involves four operations like power 
generation, transmission, distribution, and control. Table 1 shows the difference between conventional power 
grid and smart grid [7]. From the technical perspective, smart grid consists of three major systems such as smart 
infrastructure system, smart management system, and smart protection system [2]. The smart infrastructure 
system is the energy, information, and communication infrastructure underlying the smart grid. This 
infrastructure supports two-way flow of electricity and information. The smart management system provides 
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advanced management and control services and functionalities. Smart protection system provides advanced grid 
reliability analysis, failure protection, security, and privacy system. Figure 1 illustrates the smart grid topology. 
Table 1. Comparison between conventional grid and smart grid [7] 
Conventional Power Grid Smart Grid 
Electromechanical Digital 
One-way communication Two-way communication 
Centralized generation Distributed generation 
Few sensors Sensors throughout 
Manual monitoring Self-monitoring 
Manual restoration Self-healing 
Failures and blackouts Adaptive and islanding 
Limited control Pervasive control 
Few customer choices Many customer choices 
 
At the beginning of smart grid development, many research focused on the distributed generation 
management, energy storage and demand side management. Stability of the grid is studied intensively by [8] 
having a conclusion that electric generators are key to grid stability. In the energy storage field, one of the hot 
topics is level out the electricity demand fluctuation by combining electricity storage with renewable resource 
such as windmill [9]. Most literature in demand side load management used the agent-based solution having a 
hierarchical structure ensures the scalability of the solution [1]. The interaction of the electricity user also 
modeled using agent-based solution. Each of the smart grid users is an active user having the ability to consume, 
produce, and share electricity between them. 
Game theory is the best tool to model the interaction of a user to maximize their payoff. Game theory related 
to the actions of decision makers who are conscious about their actions and its effect. A game consists of a 
principal and a finite set of players, each of which selects a strategy with the objective of maximizing his utility 
[10]. The utility function represents each player’s sensitivity to others actions. 
In the computer science field of study, similar behavior is shown when the network of computer tries to repair 
itself from infection. This network commonly called self-repair network (SRN). The self-repair network consists 
of units capable of repairing other connected units in a synchronous fashion based on a probabilistic cellular 
automata model [11]. Each unit tries to repair its adjacent units and clean up network contamination with mutual 
copying. Development of the SRN model was inspired by the immunity-based system characteristic, which is 
self-maintaining and adaptive [12]. 
 
3. Mutual Support Interaction Model 
In smart grid, most of the active users have a renewable electricity generator at the house using photovoltaic, 
wind, or water. First of all, they use their own electricity resources to fulfill their own demand. They may have 
excess electricity of lack of electricity powers. If there is an excess of electricity, they may sell or give to their 
neighbors who need electricity. This user is known as an electricity seller. On the other hand, if there is a lack 
of electricity, they may purchase electricity or build a new renewable electricity generator. This user is known 
as an electricity buyer. An interaction between users in smart grid is enabled by physical and logical connection 
of the smart grid infrastructure. An alternative of physical connection is using Multi Protocol Label Switching 
(MPLS) that enable direct connection to the core network using point-to-point connection [13]. Logical 
connection may use interdependence application such as: ADR (Automated Demand Response), SCADA 
(supervisory control and data acquisition), and distribution management [14]. 
Fig 1. Smart grid topology 
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We use a dual-bus system to describe the basic interaction for each active user and active user with the electric 
company. Figure 2 illustrates a dual-bus system used by four users (C1 to C4). In the Figure 2, the line above 
shows amount of electricity power produced by user 1 and user 2 while the line below shows number of electrical 
power demanded by user 1 and user 2. In the condition where user 1 produced more electric power than it’s 
demand (PW1>D1) and user 2 produce less electric power than it’s demand (PW2<D2), transfer of electric 
power between user 1 and user 2 is enabled with price negotiation. The higher discrepancy of electric power and 
demand between supply side (user 1) and demand side (user 2) makes the bigger room for price negotiation. 
Each user may transfer some of his or her electric power to neighboring user (PWs). When two users interacted, 
the amount of electricity transferred (PWs) is depending on the production capacity (PWp), demand (D) and 
willingness to help (Prh) of the seller and buyer, respectively.  
We assume that selling price between users varies depending on their demand and production capacity. Price 
negotiation between users follows the linear trend as shown in Figure 3. First user (left hand side) has low 
demand for electricity, but high production capacity that makes him values electricity low. On the other hand, 
second user (right hand side) production capacity is lower than their demand that makes him values electricity 
high. The price discrepancy between two users and willingness to trade creates a trading transaction. The user’s 
strategies of selling or buying electricity depend on electric production, demand, and price negotiation between 
users. Each user tries to maximize payoff by changing strategy (selling or buying). Section 3.1 and 3.2 discusses 
user’s strategy in detail. 
In a disaster recovery situation, we want to examine two situations such as: (1) the users lost their connection 
to the electric company and (2) the users still have connectivity to the electric company. In the first situation, we 
assume that the users are still able to maintain their connection with the other users to sell and trade electricity. 
In this situation, the users rely on the renewable energy production to fulfill their needs of electricity and mutual 
support between users is important to reduce the shortage of electricity. In the next situation, the users do not 
only rely on renewable energy production to fulfill their needs of electricity but also from the electric company. 
In both cases, we consider several variables as follow: 
PR = market price of electricity (JPY/Kwh) 
VE= value of electricity produced by the users 
FR = fixed price of electricity from electric company (JPY/Kwh) 
Office
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MC = marginal value of operation cost (JPY/Kwh) 
PM = profit margin of electric company (JPY) 
OC = fixed cost of electricity production (Kwh) 
PWn = added capacity of electricity power after investment (Kilowatt) 
PWu = used capacity of electricity (Kilowatt) 
PWp = production capacity of electricity (Kilowatt) 
PWs = excess capacity of electricity for sale or give (Kilowatt) 
PWr = required capacity of electricity (Kilowatt) 
D = demand of electricity (Kilowatt) 
I = amount of investment for renewable electricity equipment (JPY/Kilowatt) 
Prh = probability of helping 
 
Fig 2. Dual bus-system supporting interaction between active users 
 
Fig 3. Tradeoff between demand, power and price of electricity 
Some of the variables above use the Japanese Yen as a currency reference. In this model, we consider that the 
electricity company picks up profit margin PM in the selling and buying transaction from the user. In order to 
represent the willingness of helping for each user, we declare variable Prh. The value of the variable is between 
0 and 1. The value of zero means that users do not want to help the other users by giving the excess electricity, 
but they still want to sell the electricity either to the users or to the electric company.  
The value of electricity (VE) depends on four factors such as fixed price of electricity (FR) from the electric 
company, the marginal value of operating cost (MC), the number of electricity usage (PWu), and fixed cost of 
electricity (OC). Formula 1 shows the basic calculation of the value of electricity. Furthermore, according to the 
C1  C2 
C3  C4 
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Figure 2, the market price of electricity (PR) depends on demand and production capacity of both users (D1, D2, 
PW1, and PW2). Formula 2 shows the basic calculation of the market price of electricity.  
The number of excess electricity (PWs), required electricity (PWr), and usage electricity (PWu) depends on 
the amount of demand (D) and production capacity of the electricity. Formula 3, 4 and 5 shows the basic 
calculation of those numbers.  
ܸܧ ൌ ሺܨܴ െܯܥሻݔܲ ௨ܹ െ ܱܥ (1) 
ܴܲ ൌ
ቀ ܦଵܲ ଵܹ ൅
ܦଶ
ܲ ଶܹቁ
ʹ ݔܨܴ
(2) 
ܲ ௦ܹ ൌ ൜
ܲ ௣ܹ െ ܦȁܲ ௣ܹ ൐ ܦ
Ͳȁܲ ௣ܹ ൏ ܦ  
(3) 
ܲ ௥ܹ ൌ ൜
ܦ െ ܲ ௣ܹȁܦ ൐ ܲ ௣ܹ
Ͳȁܦ ൏ ܲ ௣ܹ 
(4) 
ܲ ௨ܹ ൌ ൜
ܦȁܲ ௣ܹ ൐ ܦ
ܲ ௣ܹȁܲ ௣ܹ ൏ ܦ
(5) 
      
3.1 Users have lost their connectivity to the electric company 
In this situation, if the first user has excess power and want to sell the electricity and the second user wants to 
buy the electricity, the electricity trading occurred. The payoff for both users depends on the value of electricity 
produced and the value of the transferred electricity. The amount of transferring electricity is affected by the 
willingness to sell (1-Prh). If the first user wants to sell and the second user wants to build, the selling transaction 
does not occur. Furthermore, if the first user wants to give electricity to the second user while the second user 
wants to buy or build, the selling transaction also does not occur. In this case, the second user will always accept 
the electricity from the first user and the rest of the demand if any, will be covered from buying or building new 
renewable electrical installation. Table 2 shows the payoff matrix of these interactions where left values 
correspond to payoff user 1 and right values correspond to payoff user 2. The formula for each payoff is shown 
in Appendix A. 
 
3.2 Users have connectivity to the electric company 
There are six basic strategies that users can take to maximize their payoff, such as: sell to the electric company 
(EC), sell to the other user, give to the other users, buy from the electric company, buy from the other users, and 
build new renewable electricity installation. If the demand is more than the production capacity, they have three 
strategies such as buying from the electric company, buying from the user, or build. Otherwise, they will choose 
a strategy to sell to the electric company, sell to the other user, or give to the other user.  
The electricity trading occurs when the first user wants to sell to the second user, and the second user want to 
buy from the first user. Similar to the case of no connection with the electric company, the payoff for both users 
depends on the value of electricity produced and the value of the transferred electricity. The amount of 
transferring electricity is affected by the willingness to sell electricity by the users (1-Prh). The other strategy 
pairs do not cause electricity trading between users. It is noted that the second user buys electricity from the 
electric company with fix price (FR) while the first user sells electricity to the electric company with fix price 
(FR) and some profit margin (PM) for the electric company. Table 3 shows the payoff matrix for these 
interactions where left value is correspond to payoff user1 and right values correspond to payoff user2. The 
payoff for the electricity company is not considered in this game because we focused on interaction between 
users. The formula for each payoff is shown in Appendix B.  
 
4. Case Study and Discussion 
In this section, the proposed model is applied to the households that have dual bus system. We build tentative 
data for small communities that able to share their electricity and information through dual bus system. Each of 
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the household has a small electric generator from solar and wind with different sizes. The data for each household 
and other common electricity data are given in Table 4 and illustrate in Figure 4. 
 
Table 2. Payoff User 1 and User 2 in case of no connectivity to the electric company 
 User 2 
Buy Build 
User 1 
Sell P1, P2 P3, P4 
Give P5, P6 P7, P8 
Table 3. Payoff User 1 and User 2 in case of normal connectivity to the electric company 
  User 2 
  Buy from User Buy from EC Build 
User 1 
Sell to User P1, P2 P3, P4 P5, P6 
Sell to EC P7, P8 P9, P10 P11, P12 
Give to User P13, P14 P15, P16 P17, P18 
 
4. 1 The users have lost their connectivity to the electric company.  
In this situation, the only options for users to fulfill their electricity is buying electricity from the other users 
or build the new renewable electricity installation. Table 4 shows the payoff value for each user concerning this 
situation. It’s clearly seen from that table, the pair strategy Sell-Buy is the Nash equilibrium strategy. We refer 
that the user having production capacity of electricity higher than their demand is the seller and the user having 
production capacity of electricity lower than their demand is the buyer. Under 100 times of cycles or repetition, 
we want to know the trend of seller. It is clearly seen in Figure 5 that the number of sellers increases and reach 
steady state at around 30 cycles. We found also that high value of Prh has a negative effect toward the number 
of sellers. The Prh variable plays important role in this model since it defines a threshold between giving and 
trading. The Prh equal to 0 means each user do not want to give electricity to the others, they only want to trade. 
The best strategy to trigger improvement, in term of the number of sellers, is trading transaction of electricity. 
This fact is opposite of the humanitarian logistic situation that willingness to help (Prh) has a positive effect to 
the number of sellers [4].  
Table 4. Input variable 
No Description Value 
1 FR = fixed price of electricity from electric company (JPY/Kwh) 20 JPY 
2 PWp = amount of electricity produced (KWh) User 1: 960, User 2: 720 
3 D = demand of electricity (KWh) User 1: 480, User 2: 1200 
4 PWn = amount of added electricity power after investment (KWh) 240 
5 I = amount of investment for renewable electricity equipment 
(JPY/KWh) 
50 
6 OC = constant value of operation cost (JPY) 500 
7 MC = marginal value of operation cost (JPY/Kilowatt) 23 
8 PM = profit margin of electric company 0.2 
9 Prh = probability of helping 0.5 
10 Number of household 10,000 
11 Investment in each m2 solar panel JPY55.000 
12 Amount of electricity produced each m2 solar panel 138 watt/hour 
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Fig 4. Case illustration 
4.2 The users have connectivity to the electric company. The users do not only have options to buy and 
sell electricity from the other users, but also from the electric company. From the Table 5, we can see the payoff 
of each user concerning this situation that have Nash equilibrium at the strategy pair sell to EC – buy from EC. 
Figure 6 shows the static trend of the number of sellers. The dependability of users to the electric company makes 
static trend of the number of sellers. Similar to the humanitarian logistic situation, willingness to give/help (Prh) 
has a positive impact to the number of sellers. These figures clearly show distinct performance between Prh 
equal to 1 and the others.  
Table 4. Payoff for each user 
  
P2 
Buy Build 
P1
 Sell 2317 433 1750 0 
Give 1750 1500 1750 500 
Table 5. Payoff for each user 
  
P2 
Buy from user Buy from EC Build 
P1
 
Sell to user 2317 700 1750 1200 1750 800 
Sell to EC 1850 1000 1850 1000 1850 600 
Give 1750 200 1750 1200 1750 200 
 
Fig 5. Number of seller (normal user) in first case 
 
C1  C2 
PWs12 
PWs21 
D=960KWh
PW=480KWh 
D=720KWh
PW=1200KWh 
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5. Conclusion 
This paper successfully built deterministic model in power engineering based on game theory. The result 
shows the unique behavior of the active users toward electricity usage, especially in using heating and cooling 
appliances. The user strategy is highly affected by the suffer cost. Furthermore, in the mutual support model, we 
found the results that connectivity to the electric company is important to make mutual support operation 
successful. If the electric system lost its connectivity to the electric company, helping the other users by giving 
electricity will lead to the worst performance. On the other hand, if the electric system has its connectivity even 
after a disaster, helping the other users by giving electricity will boost the performance.  
This model is practically applicable to be used in smart grid with dual bus system. Future development of this 
research can be directed to the development of probabilistic model of mutual support system in electricity 
generation and distribution. 
 
Fig 6. Number of seller (normal user) in second case 
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